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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WILLI~-\)1

BUDGE )IE~IORL-\L
HOSPIT ~-\L. a corporation,
Pla ill tiff.
YS.

E. X. M....-\l,.GH.A.N, as County
Treasurer of Cache County~
State of l- tab.
Defendant.

Respondent's Brief
ST.A.TE)IEXT OF THE CASE.
The property described in the complaint, located in
the City of Logan, and belonging to the William Budge
Memorial Hospital, and on which is located a hospital and
nurses' home, was assessed for taxes for the year 1928,
the real property at $1,480.00 valuation, and the buildings
and improvements at $20,800.00. When the property was
advertised for sale for non-payment of taxes this suit was
brought to injoin the collection of the tax on the ground
"that said property was not, nor was any part thereof,
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subject to taxation for the year 1928, but the same was
wholly exempt from taxation by virtue of Section 3, Article 13, Constitution of the State of Utah, and Section
5863, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917." A' restraining order
was issued pending the hearing of the cause. By way
of particularity it is alleged in the complaint:

"III.
"That upon said property plaintiff continuously, during the year 1928, and for a long time
prior thereto, has maintained and operated a hospital for the care and treatment of sick, wounded
and infirm persons, and in connection with such
institution plaintiff has also maintained and conducted a home for the accommodation, comfort,
education and training of nurses in the service of
said hospital, and said real estate hereinbefore described is necessary for the convenient use and occupation of said hospital establishment of plaintiff.

"IV.
"That the occupation, use and maintenance
of said property for the aforesaid purposes is the
sole and only business of plaintiff and plaintiff at
no time during the year 1928 operated, nor was
said property, or any part thereof, at any time
during said year, used for the gain or profit of
the stockholders of the plaintiff, but said property,
and the whole thereof, with the buildings thereon,
has at all times been and now is used exclusively
for charitable purposes."
In his answer the defendant denies that the property
i'S used for charitable purposes a.nd denies that it is
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exempt from ta.xation. Defendant also sets up an affirnlative defense ""hich is. in substanL·e. thnt plaintiff was
organized in 191-1 for c~rrying on the hospital bu~int'SS
for pecuniary profit and gain. and that sAid ho~pital
is operating and has ahvay~ operattld under that poliey
and for that purpose and object ; that plaintiff, since
its org-anization, has been duly and regularly assessed
and has regularly paid taxes; that it requires the payment of large and substantial hospital fees by all patients
entering the hospital for care and treatment; that it has
requested the county to pay fees for indigent patients;
that it has demanded the payment of hospital fees before
permitting patients to leave the hospital, and that the
hospital is not a general hospital open to all medical
practitioners in good standing~ but in 1928, and prior
thereto, was operated for the gain and benefit of doctors
belonging to the Budge Clinic.
By its reply plaintiff admits that it paid taxes prior
to 1928. Admits that in 1928, and prior thereto, it was
the policy of the institution to collect its regular hospital
fees from all patients who were able to pay, and that it
has at various times applied to the County Commissioners
for the payment of hospital charges for indigents who received treatment. Plaintiff denies all other allegations of
the affirmative defense and alleges that the hospital operates under the closed staff plan, whereby all major
surgery must be performed by members of the hospital
staff assigned to that particular service.
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The court found the issues in favor of the plaintiff
and this appeal is from the judgment.
ARGUMENT.
When the case was -called for trial the plaintiff moved
to amend paragraph four, above quoted, by inserting in
the next to the last line of said paragraph, after the word
"thereon," the words "during said year," so that the
paragraph would read "but said property and the whole
thereof, with the buildings thereon, during sui·d year, has
at all times been and now is used exclusively for charitable
purposes."
The defendant objected to the amendment, upon the
ground that the paragraph, as it ·stood, presented an issue
as to the character of use of said property, not only in
1928, but for all prior years since the establishment of
the hospital; that this same issue was presented by the
allegations of the affirmative defense and plaintiff's reply
thereto, plaintiff having made no motion to strike such
affirmative allegations, so as to eliminate the question as
to the use of said property prior to 1928. The court denied
the motion to amend, using this language :
"THE ~COURT': I take it the issue is with
respect to the use of the property during the
year 1928. It may be true that the court should
go into a time prior to that to defermine what
bearing it has, but the sole question now is to
determine the use of the premises during 1928.
Now you may go into the years prior to that
perhaps as. having a bearing on the issue as to
the year 1928.
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"MR. FONNESBECI~: That is all \\.l, "·ant.
your Honor.
THE corrRT: But I think the question is
the use of the property in 1 ~1~8.
. :\IR. FOXXESBECK: \Ye do not ff't'l that we
should be restricted on the question of the entire
use that has been made of this property-THE COl'rRT: \Yell, I don't think it is neces..
sary to argue that question now; you can argue
that during the introduction of eYidence. but I
don't think that the amendment is necessary to
paragraph four." (Tr. 53-55.)
There is but one question for determination by this
court: \\~as the plaintiff's property. during the year
1928, used exclusi \ely for charitable purposes, and therefore exempt from taxation for that year?
Article 13, Section 3, of the Constitution of the State
of Ctah, provides :
"Lots. with the buildings thereon, used exclusi\ely for either religious worship or charitable
purposes * * * shall be exempt from taxation.''
Section 5863, Compiled Laws of Ctah, 1917, provides:
"Lots, with the buildings thereon, used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable
purposes * * * shall be exempt from taxation."

The evidence, without contradiction, establishes the
fact that during the year 1928, the hospital property consisted of a main building 100 feet long by 40 feet wide,
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and a nurses' home, 80 feet long and 40 feet wide, the
latter building being used, in part, for the accommodation
of patients. There are about fifty beds in the hospital
and the rates charged are $2.50 per day in a ward;
$2. 7·5 per day semi-private; $4.00 pe;r day for private
rooms, and there are two rooms in the entire hospital
at $5.00 each per day. There are thirty nurses who
are paid during their three-year course of instruction
as follows: Freshmen $9.00, Juniors $10.00 and Seniors
$11.00. These payments cover such items as b~oks, cloth.
ing, etc. (Sup. Abs. 5.) The nurses receive a course
of instruction given by the hospital staff and superintend.
ent of nurses, to qualify them to pass the State Board
examination. The hospital is equipped with laboratories,
X-rays, accessories and all other paraphernalia necessary
for carrying on hospital activities, and is standardized
as required by the American College of Surgeons. It is
recognized by the Federal Government as an institution
that is permitted to withdraw alcohol for the treatment
of patients and the government does not require it to
file an income tax report. (Sup. Abs. 7.) The hospital
is open to all who desire the benefit of its facilities,
without distinction as to race, color or creed. No person
applied for admittance in 1928 who was rejected and the
same consideration and care is given to all who enter
the institution. Most of the patients are admitted through
some member of the medical staff, but there are also
numerous patients received who are sent by Rotary and
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Kiwanis Clubs, Bishop~ of '"'ards, Relit' f Societit\~ and
other organizations, and there are also patient~ rt\l't\i\'ed
whose hospital fee~ are paid by the county. It vlas the
practice of the institution in 1928 tt) li~t each patient
upon entrance to the hospital and to charge against ~u<:h
patient or the person or organization at "·hose rt'quest
the patient \Yas received. the regular hospital fees. "·hirh
cover room accommodations. nursing~ food. n1edicines and
supplies, laboratory fee (outside of special laboratory
work) and for use of the operating roon1, in case an
operation was necessary. It was the policy and practice
of the institution during 1928 to collect from all patients
who are able to pay and to receive from the county the
hospital fees for indigent patients. During the year
1928 the hospital received about 1800 patients and the
fees charged amounted to approximately $48,000.00.
(Deft.'s Ex. 12.) The whole amount was collected, save
and except about $272.00, which amount represents the
aggregate of bills owing by twenty-one patients who
failed to pay. (Deft.' s Ex. 14.) County patients and
all patients sent in by Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs, Bishops
and Relief Societies, were treated by members of the
medical staff free of charge, in accordance with the provisions of the By-Laws, which read as follows:

"It shall be the duty of the medical staff to
treat at the hospital the worthy poor as charity
cases, free of charge; the worthiness of such cases
is to be determined by the bishops of the various
wards or the clergymen of the various churches,
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or other heads of some recognized charitable organizations or institutions, who shall nominate
the patient for free treatment and such nomination shall be concurred in or indorsed by some
one of the members of the medical staff of the
institution residing in or near the locality from
which such patient comes." (Deft.'s Ex. 2.) .
The charity work done by the doctors in 1928 aggre..
gated $2500.00. (Sup. Abs. 6.)
Except as provided in the foregoing By-Law, the
hospital had absolutely nothing to do with the fixing of
the fees of the doctors for services. performed by them,
or with the collection of any such fees. For X-ray work
and special laboratory work, which requires the services
of an expert, the hospital employed a radiologist and
technician, who was a member of the Budge Clinic, and
who received a commission on each case of seventy-five
per cent of the charge made, the check for which com..
mission was made payable to the Budge ~Clinic. This
commission charge was made in lieu of employing a per..
son at full time, and is the pra.ctice adopted in other
hospitals, as shown by the testimony of Mr. Rawson, the
president of the State Hospital Association. (Sup. Abs.
13-14.)
None of the stockholders of the corporation ever
received any returns from their investment by way of
dividends or otherwise, and none of the officers or threetors of the corporation have ever received any compensa"
tion, and no part of the hospital income has been devoted
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to any other purpose 'vhatsoever. save and exct.'pt tc the
maintenance and enlargement of th~ institution anl: the
improven1ent of its facilities. (Sup. Abs. 7. Tr. -l5--Hi.)
The eYidence sho,vs that in 1~1:~7. after a period of fourteen years, the hospital had on hand a surplus of $31,000. 00 (.A.bs. 33). and that during that year Drs. D. C.
Budoae and T. B. Budge made a donation of $5,000.00
.
34). and that this whole amount of $36,000.00
(. -\bs.
was invested in the addition to the hospital, part of
which, as before stated, is used as a nurses' home. The
hospital was. at the time of the trial, indebted to the
amount of approximately $8,000.00. Its net income for
the year 1928 was approximately $5,000.00, and this
amount also was devoted to the payment of interest and
to maintenance and operation expenses.
"While there is no evidence of any specific case of a
person applying to the hospital in 1928 for treatment,
who at the time, was known by the hospital authorities
to be unable to pay the hospital charges, Dr. Budge
testified that if at any time any such application had
been made such patient would have been received. ( Tr.
67, 87.) He explains that the territory from which the
hospital draws its patronage is one in which there are
very few transients; generally the people own their own
homes (Tr. 67) and there is little question ever raised
about hospital charges ( Tr. 138) ; but in proof of his
assertion that it was the policy of the institution to receive and take care of worthy cases, even though no
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compensation would come to the hospital, Dr. Budge, on
cross-examination, called attention to one or two cases
in prior years; one of a person who was passing through
Wellsville, who was kept in the hospital for a period of
sixteen weeks without pay (Sup. Abs. 9), and he also
mentioned other cases where persons were taken to the
hospital without regard as to whether or not they would
be able to pay, and without any inquiry being made to
ascertain that fact. A.s to the policy of the institution
he testified :
"Q. Doctor, what is the rule-I believe you
stated that a charge was made by the hospital
against all patients who come to the hospital, is
that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that. the rule-A. Now, I won't say that. There have been
a few cases that I do not call to mind where
nobody was responsible that we have taken and
treated free of charge and we haven't made any
charge against them.
Q. Don't have any record of it?
A. I stated one this morning that happened
here a little bit ago where no charge was made.
I could refresh my memory and look it up and tell
you more about it, but right off hand I couldn't.
The superintendent looks after that part of it.
Q. Has the superintendent authority to take
parties into your hospital if they say they have
no means and can't pay you.
A. When they say they have no money or
means or friends or a dollar on earth, the super..
intendent would be kicked out if he didn't take
them.
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Q.

'y ould he'?

~~-

Ye~. that i~ if I had th~ YOh'.
You generally have. don't you ..,
. -\.
.
\Yell. I n1ight haYe son1e ~ay ~n. but that
is the object of the h<)~pital all the tin1e.
Q. Do you recall the 'Villian1~ ca~l' ._, He was
run over a year ago last July -1th ·:
.A. ·Yes. sir. that "·a~ in IH~l).
Q. It was in 1821. "·asn't it?
. -\.
.
~Iaybe it "·a~. I don't remember.
Q. He had no friends here and 'vas a total
stranger, wa~ he not?
~-\. Yes. I think he ·was.
I didn't take care
of him. but I assisted with the case.
Q. He was very badly mutilated and broken
up by an automobile running over him, wasn't

Q.

he~

...-\. l- es.
Q. You came down yourself the next morn ..
ing in that case, when the man was brought to
your hospital; he was brought there in the night
time, -was he, on July 4th?
. ...\.. I think he was, yes.
Q. Didn't you go down the next morning to
the county commissioners to see them?
•..\.. X o, I did not.
Q. Did you send somebody down ?
A. X o, I did not.
Q. Did somebody go, to your knowledge?
A. Yes, I think so; I think they called up and
asked them if they would be responsible for the
case.
Q. And the reason they desired to know
that?
A. Yes, they make inquiry in these cases.
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Before they took him in?
A. No. They took him in and took care of
him without regard to whether they were going to
get a dime or not." (Tr. 87-88.)
Q.

LORENZO HANSEN, President of respondent or..
ganization, testified as follow·s :
"Q. Now, you made the remark, Mr. Hansen,
on your direct examination, that you made an
effort to collect from everybody who is able to
pay?
A. That is our policy, yes.
Q. Where did that policy appear; does it
appear any place on the. minutes of your board
meetings, or in your By-Laws, or your records,
that your policy is to admit patients who are un ..
able to pay?
A. I don't believe that I could recall the
record, but the opinion amongst all of them-Q. Well, I don't want your opinion-- ·
MR. BUDGE: I insist that he should make
his answer.
THE COURT: Yes, he may answer.
Q. Go ahead, the court said you may state
your opinion.
A. My opinion is the policy is that every.
body is admitted, regardless of their financial con..
dition. If any question comes up at any time as
to a man's responsibility to pay the bill-Q. What did you say about that?
A. If a patient comes to the hospital it is
the policy of the hospital never to ask the question
as to his responsibility, that is my opinion.
Q. That is your opinion ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That has been your idea all along'?
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.-\.

.All the time.
Q. But you say you have no Jlt'r~onai kno\\·J ..
edge of your O\vn that that al'tually i$ l'arried ou~
in the institution?
_-\. Yes. sir. I have.
Q. Ho'v do you kno'v?
_-\. 'Yell,. there \Yas a case up hen.' in Ril'hmond last X OYen1ber \\.here a \YODlan got her bae k
broke and the doctor can1e along there and picked
her up and put her in there, and they attended
her and no bill was rendered at all until after
she was well, then "-e rendered a bill, so she ,,·as
accepted.'' (Tr. 115-116.)
The foregoing statement and the quotations from the
record correctly sets forth the use made of the hospital
property and particularly the use made of it in the year
1928.

During the course of the trial appellant offered in

e-vidence the Articles of Incorporation of the respondent
company. which were at first excluded, and later, over
responden~s objection. admitted in evidence, and respondent, after the articles had been admitted, offered an
amendment to said articles.
Upon such a state of the record the question is :
Was the property of the respondent, during the year
1928, used exclusively for charitable purposes?
The appellant makes a point on this appeal that the
court erred in not throwing the case open for evidence,
with respect to the operation of the hospital for the
entire period since 1914, when respondent company was
organized, because he contends: (1) That such issue
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was presented by the complaint itself; (2) that the issue
is presented by the affirmative answer, which respondent
did not move to strike, but which it denied by its reply.
As to appellant's assigned errors, based on the refusal
of the court to permit evidence as to conditions during
years prior to 1928, we have to say, that nothing was
or is involved in this case except the respondent's exemption from the taxes of 1928. Respondent paid the taxes
for years prior and no matter how the property was
used during those years, such use is immaterial, for, if
the hospital property was not used exclusively for hospital purposes and the taxes have been paid, then they ,
have been justly paid. If the hospital property during
those years was used exclusively for charitable purposes,
it is of no importance, for we are not asking for a return ,
of any taxes for any of those years. Consequently the
one matter in issue was and is the right of the respondent
to injoin the collection of this particular tax, based upon
the use of this property for the year 1928. Paragraph
IV of the complaint cannot be reasonably construed to
open the door to the introduction of proof as to conditions
prior to 1928. It reads:
"That the occupation, use and maintenance
of said property for the aforesaid purposes is the
sole and only business, of plaintiff, and plaintiff at
no time during the ye(Jff 1928 operated, nor was
said property or any part thereof, at any time,
during Siaid ye1ar, used for the gain or profit of
the stockholders of the plaintiff, but said property,
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and the \vhole thereof, ha~ nt all times bt't'n nnd
no\v i~ used exelu~iYely for ~..·haritablt' purpo~t'~. ''
The word~ ..has at all times,'' of cour8t\ mu~t ha\'e
reference to the year 1~)~8. "·hich \vas tht' lin1ited period
twice before specified in that particular parag-raph. We
endeavored to avoid any que~tion of construction by
asking permi5~ion to an1end the complaint ". hich the
court did not consider 'vas necessary.
The mere fact that we did not ask to have the
affirmative defense stricken i~ no reason "·hy it "·as
competent to admit any proof under such defense. These
affirmative allegations presented immaterial issues, and
while it is quite proper to move to strike immaterial
allegations, the failure to make such a motion does not
make competent proof offered in support thereof.
In the case of Graham vs. Coos Bay, etc., Co. (Ore.)
139 Pac. 337, it is held:
''Where no motion is made to strike out irrele\ant matter in a pleading, it should be disregarded
at the trial.
".A. denial of an immaterial allegation raises
no issue; does not preclude the person making the
denial from insisting at the trial that the allegation
denied is immaterial, nor pre\·ent the trial court
from excluding evidence in support thereof."

In the case of Ramaswamy vs. Hammond Lum. Co.
(Ore.) 152 Pac. 223, it is held that the denial of an
immaterial allegation raises no issue.
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Securities Acceptance Corporation vs. Kane,
196 N. Y. S. 519.
Neis vs. Whitaker (Ore.) 84 Pac. 699.
Specht vs. Spangenberg (Iowa), 30 N. W. 875.
Ency. of Plead. & Prac., Vol. 21, page 256.
In the Specht-Spangenberg case the court declares:
"An affirmation, irrelevant when made, does
not become relevant when denied."
In Encyclopedia of Pleading & Practice, supra, it is
said:
"In most code states irrelevant or redundant
matter goes for nothing at the trial, whether con~
tradicted or disregarded in the pleadings."

Much is made in appellant's brief as to the character
of the respondent organization, as shown by its articles,
and it is contended that the amendment to the articles
is of no effect because not properly adopted. We contend
that a discussion of the character of the respondent or~
ganization is absolutely beside the question for considera~
tion here. It makes not the slightest difference for
what purpose respondent was organized as shown by its
articles, the sole question being : Was the property taxed
used exclusively for charitable purposes during the year
1928?
In Parker vs. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, .the L,. D. S. Relief
Society owned certain property in Salt Lake City. It
used the upstair portion of the building for relief society

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
purposes and rented the do\Ynstairs part to a mer<·antile
establishment, but used the fund derived as rental for
the purposes of the society. Held :
"That the portion of the building- used by the
society \Yas exempt from taxation. but the part
used for mercantile pursuit~ "·as subject to taxation."
If the character of the organization is to determine
whether or not the property is taxable, then. as it must
be conceded. the L. D. S. Relief Society is a charitable
organization, any property held by it should be exempt,
but this court said. in effect. that the purpose for which
the organization is formed is immaterial, the question is:
\\nat use was made of the property? That portion of
it used for the society purposes was held to be exempt,
but that portion not used for the society was held to
be subject to taxation.
In the case of Elks Ys. Grover, 40 Utah 1, 120 Pac.
192, the court held that property owned by the Elks Lodge
was used for charitable purposes and exempt from taxation and in its discussion uses this language :
''While the statutes exempting private property
from taxation will usually be strictly construed,
those statutes exempting property used for educational, religious and charitable purposes should,
just as those providing for poor relief, receive
liberal construction, for both are based on motives
of humanity and mercy, and hence Constitution,
Article 13, Section 3, exempting property used
exclusively for charitable purposes from taxation,
should be liberally construed."
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In Odd Fellow·s vs. Naylor, .53 Utah 111, 177 Pac.
214, a building owned by the Odd Fellows Lodge was in
part rented out to stores, the rental income being used to
keep the building in repair and for charitable and benevolent purposes. Notwithstanding the character of the organization, the court held that the rented part of the building was not exempt; that the ·character of the organization
does not determine the question as to the taxability of
the property.
So we contend that it is immaterial what the articles
of incorporation provide, for if the articles did, without
question, provide that the organization is a charitable institution, that fact would not be important in determining
whether or not the property was taxable in 1928. Conse..
quently if the question of the character of this organization is not effective to exempt it from taxation, the character of the organization is not effective to make its property subject to taxation. It is the use which is made of
the property, and not how or by whom it is held, and
the articles of incorporation are not material evidence
on the issue before the court.
In the Odd Fellows-Naylor case, supra, the court
declares:
"To begin with ·it must be conceded that the
owners of property to be exempted, within the
purview of the ·Constitution, are not limited to
ecclesia.stical or aharitable org.anizations, but the
exem.ption prrivilege is extended to the owners of
the property m.evn11tioned, without reg.ard to the
chara,cter of its owner. The owner may be a
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church organization. a charitable or frnternal organization. or it may he a private indiYidual, or
a corporation.··
.\ Yery intere~ting di~eu~~ion of the test to be a pplit'd
in determining "·hether property i~ t'Xt.'nlpt frotn taxation under con~titutional and ~t~1tutory proYi~ion~ ~itnilar
to our own, is. the cas-e of Reynold~ :Jiemorial Hospital \'S.
Marshall County Court (\V. \"a.) 90 S. E. ~3~. The real
estate involYed consisted of eighteen lot~. The title to
six of the lots wa5 in the Reynolds. Memorial Hospital
Training School for X urses, a corporation; the legal title
to seYen \\as held by B. :\I. Spurr and Isabelle Spurr,
Trustees for the Trinity Parish of ::Jioundsville, \Y est
'rirginia~ and the title to the other five lots was in B. M.
Spurr individually. The opinion recites:
"The Reynolds )Iemorial Hospital is not an
incorporated institution and there are no trustees,
board of nsiting physicians or surgeons, or other
persons having the care, management and control
of said institution, other than B. )f. Spurr, who
has control and management of the same. The
Reynolds ~Iemorial Hospital owns no part of
the property mentioned and described in the peti..
tion. The training school for nurses holds title
to the lots mentioned therein, but no buildings
are erected on it, but they are used for the benefit
of the hospital. The lots owned by B. M. Spurr
individually are vacant. The record fails to dis..
close that Trinity Parish, a church organization
at Moundsville, receives any benefit from the
property conveyed to B. M. Spurr and Isabelle
Spurr, Trustees for such organization. It is art.
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mitte,d in the record that the Reynolds Memorial
H ospit.al is a private institution. None of the
prop,erty is vested in trustees, in trust for chatrit..
able purposes."
In discussing the evidence under which the legal title
to the property was held the court declares :
"These conveyances do not limit or in any wise
control the grantees in the use of the property.
It may be used for any lawful purposes. The mere
fact that the property is used for hospital pur..
poses is not sufficient to exempt it from taxation.
Hospitals are not among the property named in
the constitution as exempt. It may, however, be
exempt, if it comes within the property used for
charitable purposes."
Further on the court declares :
"It is most strenuously insisted by counsel
for appellant that this is not a charitable institution, for· the reason, among others, 'that there is
no valid trust devoting the property sought to be
taxed to any charitable use, or to any use whatsoever.' This is true, as we have seen that the
conveyances under which the property is held do
not limit or in any way control the grantees in the
use to be made of the property * * *
"The purpose for which the property is to be
used is not specified in the conveyances. Is this
necessary? Can there be any charitable use without a trust, that is to say, without a trust requiring the property to be used for that purpose?
The applicants do not seek exemption from taxation on account of the title by which they hold
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the property. nor the CM1-cf·<'frr ot the a.uthorit !I
to ron.trol it. but for the renson that it i~ propt'rty
used for 'charitable purposes., and by t ht' constitution of the $tate n1ay be ext'nlpt fron1 taxation.
It i$ the use to ""hich the property is to be applied
that determine$ ''"hether or not it tnay be t'Xt'Hlpt
from ta.~ation. That i$ the lang·uage of the constitutil"~n'property used for charit~1ble purposes.' If property u~ed for charitable purposes,
and for that reason e...~empt from taxation. should
cease to be used for that or other purposes exempting it from taxation, it would at once become liable
for taxation, without any change of O\\~nership."
In the case of Lacy \·s. Da,is (Io,Ya) 83 X. \Y. 784,
the Knights Templar claimed certain property to be
exempt under a statutory proYision exempting "all grounds
and buildings used for charitable. benevolent or religious
institutions and societies, devoted solely to the appropriate object of these institutions * * * and not leased
or otherwise used with a view to pecuniary profit." The
court held that the property was not exempt and uses
this language :
"Whether the Grarul Commandry belongs to
the class tho;J; may CULim the e:temption 1Ce do not
find it necessary to determine; for conceding it to
belong to the class it must appear that the property
is devoted solely to the appropriate objects of such
institution. It is only when the property is directly used for charitable, benevolent or religious
purposes that it is exempt from taxation."
Here the court clearly indicates that the question
of the character of the institution is altogether immaterial.
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It was not necessary for the court to determine what
its character was.
In Bishop and Chapter of Cathedral of St. John vs.
Treasurer (Colo.) 86 Pac. 1022, in a suit involving the
exemption of the plaintiff's property, it appeared that
Rev. Oaks, the superintendent of the institution, had
issued a prospectus concerning the work and progress
of the institution, in which it was stated that the home
was not a charitable institution. The defendant attempted
to introduce this statement as tending to show the character of the institution claiming the exemption of its property. The defendant also attempted to show that Oaks
had made oral statements to the same effect as his written statement. The court held that the objection to
this offered evidence was properly sustained, and that
the question was whether the property was, as a matter
of fact, being used for charitable purposes in contemplation of law.
We consider that the foregoing decisions, including
the Utah cases heretofore cited, dispose of the contention
that the character of the corporation owning the property
(that is, whether the corporation was or was not organized for charitable purposes) is a material element in
determining whether property owned or used by it should
be taxed. Whether the property is owned by a charitable
organization or a non-charitable organization, or whether
it is owned by an individual, is altogether immaterial.
In the case of Reynolds Memorial Hospital vs. Marshall
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County Court, supra. it "·ill be rt'called that som{l or thl'
property ''"as o"-ned by B. l\1. Spurr indiYidually. and if
he ''"as like most other hun1ans it would not be l'Oiltl'nded
that he ''"as a charitable organization, y~t tht' propL'rty ,,·as
held to be exempt fron1 taxation. In the ease or Parlu'r
Ys. Quinn, supra, and the Odd Fello,vs cast'. the org-anizations owning the property "·ere charitable~ but that fact
did not exempt the property fron1 taxation. ~o all discussion as to the nature and character of respondent. and
as to what it has power to do under its original articles,
is of no consequence and should not influence the decision
herein.
Even- if, as a matter of legal construction, respondent,

under its original articles of incorporation, had power
to declare dividends its business was neYer carried on
for the purpose of pecuniary profit or gain, and the
amendment to its articles, even though it may be claimed
that there were fatal defects in the proceedings for its
adoption, indicates a formal declaration of the corporation's policy, to continue as it had theretofore operated,
that is to continue to do business without pecuniary profit
to any of its stockholders, and without any intention to
declare di\idends. Throughout the entire fourteen years
of its existence none were declared which is the best
kind of proof as to the institution's policy. We contend
that it is not necessary for the court to pass upon the
legality of the proceedings for the adoption of the amendment, or to pass upon the question of the character of
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the institution, as determined from its original articles.
The only question in which the court is interested is as
to the purpose for which the property was used in 1928.
Now let us determine whether respondent's property
was used, during 1928, for charitable purposes. We shall
call attention to a. number of authorities and as we proceed will discuss the evidence in this case, as shown by
the record.
In the case of Nuns of St. Dominic vs. Younkin, 235
Pac. 869, the facts were very similar to the facts in the
case at bar. The hospital was erected at a cost of
$200,000.00, but at the time of the trial it had reduced
its indebtedness to $130,000.00, by the earnings of the
institution and by certain donations. The hospital consisted of rooms for patients, laboratories and operating
rooms, X-ray room and equipment for scientific tests.
The building was used also for rooms for student nurses
q.nd rooms for other nurses and persons in charge of the
institution.

It received all persons not suffering from

contagious diseases.

Its schedule for rooms was from

$14.00 to $35.00 per week. A number of patients were
treated that were sent by the county organizations, for
which the county, under an agreement, paid a certain
agreed sum. The following is a quotation from the facts
found:

. "The patients received at the hospital are
charged .on the books of the plaintiff with the full
a.mount of the services rendered to them. The evidence disclosed that in the case of county patients
the difference between the full charge for the
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services performed and the amount paid to tla\
plaintiff by the county ''"as cr~dit~d on tht\ books
of the plaintiff as charitable \York. and this difference thus denominated, an1ounted to something
over t'Yo thousand dollars for the past year. The
total amount of money receiYt.'d b~· the hospital
was :1bout $3~.000.00 for the past year.''
.. There 1ras fW fTidence introdu.L·t·d to cstal>lish
the fact that the plain:tiif h.ad erc-r rcceil't'd n
patifnt at its ho~pital. w·itlz the 1nufe-r~tanding a.t
tke tin:t' U rt'f'eit·cd such patient. that care and
treatment wou:d be gireu u~ithaut pay, except to
relatives of the sisters of the order and sisters of
other orders and the clergy. who received services
at said hospital 'Without charge. * * * "
•·The moneys which have been received by
the plaintiff, either by gifts, legacies or from
moneys received from patients, have been used
in maintaining the hospital and to pay interest
on indebtedness, and figuring depreciation on the
building and equipment, there has been no surplus
earned over and above the cost of maintenance."
"The hospital is recognized by the Federal
Government as a scientific and charitable institution, and as such is permitted to withdraw alcohol
from the bonded warehouse, free of all tax."

"The plaintiff was also excused from making
income tax return to the Collector of Internal
Revenue."
Later in the opinion the court uses this language :
"The fact that it charges and receives pay
from patients able to pay, does not detract {rCYm
the chmritable nature of the services rendered. In
Hospital Association vs. Baker, supra, ninety-five
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per cent of the patients were pay patients. In
City of Antonio vs. Santa Rosa Infirmary, supra,
eighty-seven and a half per cent were pay patients.
In St. Elizabeth Hospital vs. Lancaster County,
supra, only a small per cent did not pay. In Hospital vs. County Court, supra, about forty per
cent paid. Neither does the fact that the hospital
ha.s been able to increuse the value of the plant,
from money received from p.ay patients and donations, det7'>act from its charita~ble purpose. The
St. Elizabeth Hospital, at Lincoln, Nebraska, began
with donations aggrega,ting twenty thousand dollars, 1and in thirty yea;rs increased the value of
its property to five hundred thousarnd dollars. St.
Elizabeth Hospital vs. Lancaster County, supra.
The Sant,a Rosa Infirmary of San Antonio, was
able to pay an indebtedness of one hundred twentyfive thousand dollars in about three yeAars. City
of San Antonio vs. Santa Rosa lnfirJrbary, supra."
In St. Elizabeth Hospital vs. Lancaster County (Neb.)
189 N. W. 981, it was shown, as stated in the case of
Nuns of St. Dominic, supra, that the property in thirty
years had increased from twenty thousand dollars to
five hundred thousand dollars, and as stated in the
opinion the hospital had a surplus of forty thousand
dollars. The court uses this language :
"No individual, society or corporation receives
any pecuniary profit from hospital property, funds
or earnings. Surplus and donations are used to
enlarge buildings and to improve hospital facilities,
equipment and service. The institution is open
alike to charity patients and others, without regard
to race or religious beliefs. Reasonable compensa-
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tion is required from those 'vho nrt\ able to pay
it. Only a sn1all percent~lg't' of those who Sl\l'k
rooms in and hospital eare. ho\Vt.\\'t'r. can lw l'Oilsidered charity patients. b-ut thi.'{ dOt's 11ot rha·uue
the c·ha ritable puJ"'J)O$t'~ for 1chi<~lt the J)ro·plTfy is
used .. lchen: no O'llC recfil't'S any pe~u.niary profit
fronl any source.··
In the ca~e at bar it i~ ~ho"11 by the record that
in fourteen year~ the respondent accun1ulated thirtyone thousand dollar~ ~urplu~. and that its net earnings
for the year 192S were something OYer fiYe thousand
dollars. but it also appears that all this money \\·as put
back into the institution, to improYe its facilities.
Counsel argues (~-\pp. Br. p. 39) that "the merchant,
the cobbler, the baker~ the manufacturer'' could argue
that if they had more money to put back into their
business institutions to make improvements and enlargements they could better serve their patrons but that
this should furnish no reason "yhy their property should
be exempt. Of course not, because even though these
business men might put some of their income back into
the business there is a part of it which they use as
profits, and the business they do and the use they make
of their property is for the sole and only purpose of
pecuniary gain to themselves. If counsel will give these
suggestions careful consideration they will probably discover some slight difference between the use made by
a business man of a mercantile establishment and the
use made of hospital property. In the cases we have
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just cited the hospitals made large net earnings but as
those earnings were invested in the plant, the use made
of the property was held to be charitable.
In City of Dayton vs. Trustees of Speers Hospital
(Ken.) 176 S. W. 3~61, Annot. ,Cases 1917 B 275, the following is the syllabus:
"The testatrix gave property to three persons,
in trust for the establishment of a hospital; the
trustees to report annually to the chancery court
in the county, and such court to fill all vacancies in
the office of trustee. The hospital received private
pay patients; public patients coming there of
their own accord or sent there by the county and
certain nearby cities, including the city in which
the hospital was located, and which was seeking
to subject the hospital to taxation. No p·atients
were kept without charrge, but some of those who
came of their own accord failed to pay, and no
one has ever been turned away for inability to
pay. The county and such cities compensated the
hospital as to patients sent by them, but in a
sum less than the actual cost. The operation of the
hospital resulted, in the differe;nt years, either in
a deficit or in a very small gain. There was no
provision for reversion in the will. The trustees
served without pay and it did not appear that it
was ever intended that any private gain should
result. The profit from private patients, who
paid for their care and treatment, went into the
general fund of the hospital and was used for
maintaining it. It is held that the hospital property was exempt from taxation as a public charity,
since whatever is done or given gratuitously, in
relief of the public burdens or for the advancement
of public good, is a public charity, and an institu-
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tion founded and endo"·ed ns n publk charity
thereby does not lose its charnt•tt'r as sud1 under
the tax hnYs. if it rt'<·t'il'fS a. n"rt:·nue ;rom the
re(•ipie·nts of it$ bounty s·uffir-ie·ut to kt·ep it in
operatt'".o-n.. Or. applying another tt'st, if the objt\<.-t
for "·hich an instituiton is founded h~ the g-t.\IH\ral
public good, and not priYate gain, and it is so
conducted that the public receives all the benefits
of it. it is purely a public charity."
In its opinion the court declares :
nThe fact that the institution receives a revenue from the recipients of its bounty sufficient to
keep it in operation. does not take from it its
character as a public charity~ where it '\Vas founded
and endowed as such. and "~hen all of the receipts
go to providing for the purposes for \Yhich it was
erected and maintained. The municipalities and
county itself. in which the institution is located,
and whose duty it is to care for the indigent sick
of each of them respectively. have by its use been
saved the burden of erecting an institution of the
kind of their own, or otherwise caring for such
sick."
Under our law it is the duty of the county to care
for its indigent sick (See Sec. 1400x40, Compiled La\\'S of
Utah, 1917) . Far better that it should be able to care
for them by paying reasonable hospital charges than to
build a hospital of its own.
The above quotation suggests an element for consideration, which is often disregarded. It seemed to be the
attitude of counsel at the trial, and from his brief he
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does not seem to have changed his conception, that in
order to prove that hospital property is used exclusively
for charitable purposes, it must appear that the people
may apply for treatment, without being obliged to pay
for the services rendered. Undoubtedly a hospital thus
using its property vvrould be using it for charitable purposes, but it is likewise used for such purposes if patients
pay for such service, if it is operated and conducted for
public good and not for private gain. Let us assume
that there was no hospital in the City of Logan; that
the citizens of that community, under proper legal authority, determined to establish a hospital; that to provide
for such institution they issued bonds of the city, which
were sold and the proceeds used for the construction and
equipment of the institution. L:et us further assume that
the city should receive all persons who applied for treatment and made no charge for hospital services and treatment. It is obvious that there would be only one way
by which that institution could possibly exist. All the
people of the city would have to be taxed, not only to
pay the interest on the bonds, but to pay for the maintenance, upkeep and cost of operation. All the people within
the corporate limits, whether or not they had occasion to
use the hospital at any time, would be obliged to help
maintain it. Now let us further suppose that in this
institution established by the city any doctor licensed
to practice in the State of Utah might take his patients
to the . institution, perform any operation, whether of ~i
minor or major surgery that he considered necessary, i~
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or prescribe any other treahnent. C'oungd will sny that
such an in~titution i~, of eour8e. a t•hnritable organization;
that the property of 8Uch institution would. undt~r sttt'h
conditions, be used for charitable purpt)8t.'~. All rig·ht.
let us concede that fact. In \rh~lt rt'8pt\l'ts does the
respondent hospital differ·? \Yilliam Budgt~ l\leinorial
Hospital \Ya~ e~tablished by tht' voluntary contributions
of its stockholders. "·ho. as sho"..n by the record. paid for
their stock and have never, at any time, received a diYidend or any other financial return. They put up the
money instead of it being provided by the city. To the
institution which they established all n1ay come for treatment, except those afflicted with contagious diseases or
insanity. The corporation asks no donations from the
city. county or state. It asks nothing from anyone who
does not use the hospital. but those "~ho apply for the
benefit of its facilities are charged reasonable rates.
This is the practice observed by all hospitals. \Yith one
possible exception. ( _-\.bs. 29.) The rates charged are
lower than the rates of other hospitals, according to the
testimony of Dr. Budge (Sub ..A.bs. 10), and generally
lower than in other hospitals, as testified by Mr. Rawson (.A.bs. 43). Is this charge made to benefit the stockholders? Is it made to benefit the officers of the corporation? Xo. It is made simply to permit the institution
to exist and carry on its work, to improve its facilities
and enlarge its accommodations. In short, to keep this
institution in a condition so that it can be used to best
advantage for the benefit of those who are suffering from
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InJuries or disease. Instead of all taxpayers paying the
cost of operation, those who receive the immediate benefits
pay such cost. Is it not as much a charitable organization as a hospital built by the city would be?
But appellant contends that the patients in the William
Budge Memorial Hospital are taken there by members of
the medical staff. We grant that this generally is the
case, although it appears from the testimony of Superintendent Larsen (Abs. 36) and others, that the hospital
is open to all who desire to be admitted, and that organizations of different kinds send patients to the institution;
so that the institution is open to the entire public. There
is no restriction to prevent any person from enjoying
its benefits. Whoever enters the institution will have a
charge made against him for the hospital fees, and the
hospital will request payment of all who can pay. "But,"
it is insisted, "every doctor cannot take his patients to
the hospital, because every doctor is not permitted to
perform major surgical operations, or to use the X-ray,
and that as limitations are placed upon the right of doctors
to operate and to use the X-ray, such regulation virtually
excludes the patients of doctors who are not members
of the medical staff; that because of this condition the
hospital is really not open to the public generally." Such
reasoning is pure falacy. The limitation is not in any
sense a restriction on the public right of entrance to
the institution, but only on the physician or surgeon.
It might as well be contended that a public school is not
open to the public, because each pupil has not the right

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

83
to have a teacher of his own selection. E'"t'ry Wt'll rt'glllated institution must haYe rules 'md rt:\gulations for tht•
conduct of its business. One of tht' rules "·hi~h this
and other bospit.:1ls haYe adopted is that it "·ill t'xt·lude
patients suffering :fron1 eonra~dous dist'~\ses ~nd from
insanity. That, of course. n1ust be eonL·eded to bt' a
reasonable regulation. Other regulations are those with
reference to patient~· diet, hours for Yisitors. treatment
and attention by nurses. rather than by relatiYL'S or
friends, etc .. etc. These regulatiL)ns are not questioned;
they are for the good of the pntient; but a rule which,
for the good of the patient ~o ill as to require a major
surgical operation or technical X-ray treatment, forbids
such service, except at the hands of a member of the
staff, who by experience is able to render the best service,
is termed a regulation which excludes the general public.
It no more excludes the public than any of the other regulations. All are welcome, but all must conform to the
roles and regulations of the institution which are not
novel or even unusual. They are in effect in all well
regulated hospitals, and what is called the "closed staff"
system is in effect in most hospitals, particularly in the
East. (A.bs. 30.) As stated by Dr. Budge:
"There are three kinds of staffs, a closed
staff, a mixed staff and an open staff, and most
of the hospitals in the L"nited States, particularly
throughout the East, are exactly like ours. ( Tr.
84.)
Q. It is of more benefit to you to have a
rule like that, is it not?
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A. Yes, I make more, but it is an advantage
to the patient, absolutely.
Q. Well, it would be an advantage to the
patient if you are a better surgeon than the other
man, you mean?
A. Yes, by reason of my experience I would
be worth more to the patient?
Q. Yes, I understand that you take that for
granted that you would be?
A. I just happened to have been put in that
position. I think from my experience and ali-I try to do my level best. But that would apply
to any doctor. Experience is what counts in major
surgery. I would like to make it clear that our
hospital is not different from most other hospitals
in the United States in surgery.
Q. Well I don't know about that.
A. I do.
Q. I thought possibly if you knew about
them all in the United States you would know
something about the other one here in Logan.
A. There isn't a hospital in the United States,
of any size, that I can't tell you about." (Tr. 8485.)
So, as before stated, as an incident in the management and method of operation of the Budge Memorial
Hospital, the medical director and his assistant perform
all major surgical operations, but they could do all such
surgical operations, if the patients desired it, in any
other hospital that is open to doctors generally.

The

fact that other doctors are excluded from that particular
work, may be displeasing to one or two ambitious young
doctors, but the regulation does not prevent all members
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of the general public, "·ho desire hospital st'rYit'l\ frotn
receiving the benefits of tht' hospital facilities.
In the case of Sisters of St. Francis v~. Board of
Revie"~ (Ill.) 88 X. E. ~7~. a sin1ilar QUt'stion wa~ rai~t'd
and answered by the court as follo\\·s:
"It i~ then urged that the institutiun is. in
effect. being condut'ted and its property used for
the benefit of certain physicians in the City of
Peoria. This contention is based upon the fact
that the board of managers of the corporation
has e~tablished certain rules of government, by one
of which rules no physicians are permitted to practice in the hospital, except such as subscribe to
and are governed by the principles of medical
ethics promulgated by the American ~Iedical Association. It does not appear from this record
what percentage of the physicians present in the
City of Peoria would be eligible under this rule.
It does appear, however, from the testimony of
these sisters~ who are in actual management of
the hospital, that they understand the rule permits
all reputable physicians to doctor patients in the
institution, and that but few physicians present
in Peoria are excluded. The sisterhood does not
provide medical attention. The patient is permitted to call in the physician or surgeon he desires, who is not e:tcl1uled by the rule in question.
When the patient is unable to pay for medical
care he is treated free of charge by the members
of the medical profession in the hospital. The
question whether or not this is an institution of
public charity depends not at all upon what class
of physicians are permitted to practice there, so
long as the institution is not conduc-ted for the
purpose of benefiting the physicwns of that class.
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A hospital is primarily for the benefit of the
patients, a.nd not the physicians. Whether or not
it is a charity is to ·be determined by the treatment
which the patients re~eive at the ha~ds of those
in charge of the hospital."
No proof was offered to show that any physician
in Cache County feels aggrieved because of the rule of
the respondent relating to major surgery except Dr. Hansen, who at the time he discussed the matter with Dr.
Budge, had been out of school one year and two months
(Tr. 186), and who in 1928 had access to another hospital
for his work.
In the case of New England Sanitarium vs. Stoneham (Mass.) 91 N. E. 385, the institution had a regulation that those who applied for treatment should not
be admitted until a committee had passed upon the character and financial standing of the applicant, and yet the
court held that the institution was operated for charitable
purposes. In discussing the facts the court has this
to say:
"If those who applied for treatment or for
a reduction from the regular rates were not admitted until a committee had passed upon the
character and financial standing of the applicant,
a regulation of this nature was not only reasonable,
but necessary, to prevent imposition."
In McDonald vs. Mass. General Hospital, 21 American
Reports, 529, it is held:
"The fact that a corporation, established for
the maintenance of a public hospital, by its articles
requires of its patients payment for their care, ac-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
cording to their circunlstanct's a11d the nl·comnlodntions they r~eiYe. and that 'llO pen~on luls huiil~idually a. right to d t"nHHld adtnis.~io-u. a ntl t Ita f
the trustee$ of tht' hospitaJ dt~te,..,uine who are
to be re(·ci cet! does not rt'"lldtT it tht' lrss a, pul>li<·

cha.rit!l. ··
In

~uch YS • .A.5sociation.

etc .. 109

~las~. 558,

it is

said:
··A. corporation established for the support
of poor old women. which devotes all of its funds
to the support of such "·omen in its home. and
is no source of profit to its members, is a charitable
corporation, altlwugh it req1tire.. :~ a paynzent oj
,m.oney as a requisite for ad:nlitting the women into
its hO'm,e. ·'
Is it unreasonable for an institution seeking the best
results for its patients to prescribe a rule that major

operations-those operations which are of serious import-shall be performed only by the medical director or
his assistant, who are constantly engaged in that particular class of work? Or that the X-ray work shall be
performed by a specialist employed by the institution
for that purpose? Or that the special laboratory work
shall be done only by an expert technician? Logan is a
small community and the number of major surgical operations are comparatively few; that is, few in comparison
with the number performed in large hospitals in large
cities. And such is also true of the number of patients
who need X-ray treatment, and for whom special labora-
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tory work is necessary. Surgeons, who do all the major
surgical work, are bound to become more expert in it,
and the results for the public are better than to have
patients operated on by every doctor, irrespective of whether
he has had experience or not-perhaps out of college only
a year or two-and who, earnest and careful as he might
try to be, is not competent to assume the responsibility
of serious operations. Likewise with the X-ray and special
laboratory work. These regulations are established for
the benefit of all who come to receive treatment in that
institution.
Our friends are unkind enough to say that these
restrictions upon the performance of major surgical operations, and with respect to X-ray and laboratory work,
are placed for the benefit of the Budge ~Clinic. We beg
to differ with counsel. It is merely incidental that members of the Budge Clinic happen to do the major surgery,
and they receive no greater or different compensation
than if they performed the operation at the patient's home
or elsewhere. If there were a public hospital in Logan
in which members of the Budge Clinic had made no
investment (they cbntributed at least one-half of the
original investment in this hospital) they would be privileged to take every operative case to such an institution,
with all the privilege~ in the performance of their work
which they enjoy in this institution. (Abs. 29.) Furthermore the Budge Clinic has never received a dime from
this institution, except the seventy-five per cent charged
for X-ray and laboratory work performed by a member
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of that dinir. e...xpert in that. w·ork. Th~ ~t'\'t''nty-fi\'t' pt•r
cent commission "·as paid as any otht:•r ho~pit~\1 t•xtwn~t~.
and, as testified, by )Jr. Ra"·~on. i~ ~u1 t'XPt'll~t· rt'L~ognizl•d
in sixty per cent of the ~n1allei" ho~pitals, inrludin~ t ht'
Dee Hospital at Ogden, of "·hich )Jr. Ra\v~tlll i~ ~uperin
tendent, up to the tin1e that hi~ ho~pital con$idert•d tht•
work of the institution justified the employn1ent of a
full time radiologist. To quote from his testimony :
Calling your attention particularly to
the use of the X-ray and the seientific part of the
laboratory work that is required to be done by
a physician. I will ask you whether or not the use
of the :X-ray. in the manner in "·hich it "·a~
testified here, that is to say, the employment by
the hospital of some one or some technician, or
more than one technician, to operate and interpret
the X-ray and do this scientific laboratory work,
is a use of hospital property that is common to
hospitals throughout the country. reputable hospitals, on a percentage basis to the operator.
_-\.. I should like to make just a little explanation. There is a difference between a technician and a radiologist. A technician is employed
to take pictures. _-\. radiologist understands and is
employed as an expert to interpret the pictures, as
Dr. Budge testified here yesterday. My investigation was throughout the United States, and in fact
an inquiry was sent out by the American Hospital
Association, and they found that the smaller hos. pitals, over sixty per cent of them, were employing such people on a commission basis. I also
talked to a number of hospitals individually, because we are in the same position as a small hospital,
and I talked to them for the purpose of ascertain"Q.
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ing what was the best to do. I found that a
commission was paid, from sixty to eighty per
cent to the radiologist for interpreting these pictures. Getting this information-the reason for'
giving a commission was this: That the hospitalslll
are not in a position to employ a full time radiolQv1.~1
gist, because they vvould have to specify certain:.,
hours for them to be there, but by placing them '-'
on a commission basis it was to the interests of~~
the radiologist to come any time that he might 1~~
be needed. In our own hospital we have employed ~~
1
up to the first of the year a man who had absolute charge of the X-ray. We gave him seventy. :~t
five per cent; however, in this case he furnished,~~
his own supplies. There is one hospital in Salt~i~
Lake City that is paying eighty per cent." (Tr..j
118-121.)
·.
;[((:

On cross-examination he testified:

+'

What hospitals do you have in mind l~iVt
in the State of Utah where a commission of sixty 1 ili~l~
per cent or· over that is paid to the man who in- 1 j
terprets these pictures, the radiologist, is that~~~
right?
~m
A. 'The . Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake ~n~
City, and the L. D. S. Hospital, up until some ·:1n
time last year, when they made a change on the ··m
salary basis.
.'.u f
Q. And what is the Holy Cross Hospital- j~~~
what do they pay in percentage?
~~m
A. They advised me they were paying eighty ;Hr
per cent. (Tr. 122.)
1
Q. Do you mean to testify also that you
have been told at the Holy Cross Hospital that feej.l~
are collected as hospital fees?
1~
00
A. Yes, sir.
·.
"Q.

1

1

!. ~
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Q.
.-\.

.-\nd turned over to this radiologist·:
Eighty per cent."

It is true that )Ir. Ra"·son ttlstified that in the
· 'Dee Hospital. an institution of one hundred t\ighty. fh~e beds (Tr. 11~) the radiologist fu1,1ished his O\VD
·:~pplies on a commission charge of seYenty-fh·t.' per cent
:- =(Tr. 1:21), but the \Yitness did not know· that sueh wa~
.::_the case with the Holy Cross Hospital, "·hich paid eighty
per cent commission. although he says that that hospital
:::does provide the machine (Tr. 1~~). It may well be that a
·=commission of se\enty-fiYe per cent is reasonable in a
- hospital of only fifty beds even though the radiologist
did not furnish his own supplies. There is nothing in
the record to show that such an arrangement was unfair
:in any particular. Counsel's attempt to make capital out
::of this element of the case ( . -\pp.
.
Br. 23) indicates a dis:-:position to criticize for the sake of criticizing. If the
-institution was well managed for the benefit of the institution, as counsel admits, is it not reasonable to assume
::that it made only such arrangement as was fair and
· ·reasonable in agreeing to pay a seventy-fh·e per cent
:~commission

and to furnish the supplies to the radiologist,
-bearing in mind that the hospital is small and that perhaps
~Dnly a small percentage of its patients require X-ray
work.
-_,

This hospital, so far as the use of its property is

eoncerned, is no different from the Holy Cross, St. Marks,
L. D. S., Dee Hospital in Ogden, or any other Class A
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hospital in the intermountain region. It receives, without
discrimination, all persons who desire the benefit of its
facilities; it charges all patients and collects from those
who are able to pay; it gives all patients the same character of attention and care; it pays, in addition to its
other overhead expense, a commission to a radiologist, and
for special laboratory work; it charges indigent patients
and receives pay from the county; it charges patients
sent by Rotary Clubs and other organizations and receives
pay from such organizations; it pays no dividends or
compensation to its stockholders, officers or directors;
it devotes all its net income to maintaining the institution,
enlarging and improving its facilities, and in liquidating
its indebtedness. It is clear from the t~stimony of Dr.
Budge and Mr. Rawson that the hospital of the respondent
is operated under the same sort of rules and regulations
and under the same policy as other hospitals.
Dr. Budge testified, in referring to the surgical work ~
done by him in the hospital :
"Q. The fact is there is no charge made to
you, isn't it, by the hospital?
A. No.
Q. You mean that isn't a fact, or is it?
A. The hospital doesn't charge me for any.
thing.
Q. You get everything free?
A. I take my patients there in .the operating
room.
Q. The hospital furnishes you with the gloves,
do they not?
A. Y·es, that is true at all hospitals.
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Yes. you doctors. I suppos~. n1akt' tht'~t'
rules for all the hospitals, do you ·.l
.A.. X o. sir. the other hospitals n1akt' t ht' rules
and 've folio"· then1.
Q. Is that the reason you think you an'
Q.

charitable~

~-\..

Yes. sir. "~e ar~ the s~m1e as ~\'tlry otht'r
hospital in the United States. \Yith onf' exct'ption.
They all charge their patients. eYery one of then1,
e.."{actly the same as we do.
Q. They all charge their patients'?
...-\.. Yes. sir.
Q. Do they for the Children· s l\Iemorial Hospital in Salt Lake-do they do that?
A. That may be the exception. They charge
whenever they can pay.
Q. Yes. they have a tendency to do that.
A. E¥ery hospital in the land.
Q. Xow. how about the instruments, the
surgical instruments the hospital always takes
care of keeping up the instruments, does it?
A. l~es, that is true at all hospitals.
Q. You are right in line there~
...-\.. Yes." (Tr. 80-81.)

Mr. Rawson testified :
"Q. Xow, 3ir. Rawson, from your experience
as a manager and from your information as to
the conduct of hospitals, what is the practice of
hospitals in the collection of hospital fees from
patients?
A. ~fy experience with all hospitals that I
have come in contact with is that they have practically the same problems that we have here in
Utah. Hospitals are either built by some church,
or by some private people, cities or counties, and
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where they do not collect their bills they either
have to have endowments or donations or collections from some one to maintain the institution.
In our various conventions the subject is always
brought up for the purpose of bettering the hospitals, that they may render more efficient service
to the communities which they serve, and it has
been the unanimous opinion that they should endeavor to collect all that is possible to maintain
these institutions, in view of the fact that there
is only about seventy per cent of the beds which
are filled all the time, and then they have their
overhead expense, whether all the beds are filled
or not, and in many instances they have people
who are unable to pay, although they have to take
care of them, ana for that reason it is recommended that the prices charged should be based
on the conditions of each locality,, and place the
prices at a figure at which they can maintain their
hospitals.
Q. Including the necessary improvements?
A. Including the necessary improvements.
Q. So it is your opinion that they all, so
far as you know, collect, as far as possible?
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 121-122.)
On cross-examination he testified :
"Q. Do you know whether hospitals pay
their own way, as a general rule?
A. I know they do not.
Q. You know they do not?
A. Yes, sir, the majority of them.
Q. Does yours run behind?
A. Whenever we make improvements we have
to have donations from the church."
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Again on redirect examination he stated:
"Q. ~Ir. Raw·son, ho"· do these rntes here that
il '{"'_~
have been testified to, comparl\ \vith the rates t\lsllwhere?
:a
..:\.. \l'ell, in some respects the ratt:ls arl' higher

I I I I~- ,.-.i~.

~~'~' elsew~er~erally

I

I

I

ii.

I I I ll

speaking?

. -\..
.
The rates here are lower than they are
in most places:· (Tr. 127.)

So that if this hospital property is ta.xable, the
property of all l.;tah hospitals is ta.xable, "·hether they declare dhidends or not, and notwithstanding the fact that
: they are not operated for profit or gain, and that none of
- the income of the institution is used or devoted to the
: enrichment or advantage of any individual. Of course,
_ any institution which uses its property for any non.: charitable purpose should pay taxes, but it has been
universally held, as we have shown by the authorities,
1 1 1 1 It that property used as respondent uses its property is
!used exclusively for charitable purposes within the mean: I I I 11f
· ing of the constitution and statute.
1

Counsel attempts to make a point that the institution
is not using its property for charitable purposes because,
they claim, poor patients have been held in the institution
until hospital charges were paid. The contention, of
oourse, in the light of the facts, is wholly without foundation in fact. There is no evidence at all of any such
case in 1928, or at any other time. A man named
Schanke testified that when his wife was ready to leave
the hospital they would not let her go until they called
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him up and had him come up and pay the bill. That
was in 1926. The only conclusion deducible from Schanke's
testimony is that a nurse at the hospital requested that
payment be made before the patient left the hospital and
that Schanke went up and paid the bill and took her
away. It was not shown that any officer of the institution had any knowledge of the matter, or that the nurse
was following instructions of the hospital authorities.
In reply to counsel for appellant Dr. Budge testified:
"Q. If a patient said he wanted to go, irrespective of what you "\vould say, would you tell
him to stay around or let him go?
A. We don't compel anybody to stay, and we
have no authority to do so, as I understand it."
(Tr. 138.)
If it were the policy of the hospital to imprison or
en cage (to use counsel's language) all who do not pay,
how does it come that according to the records (Exhibit
14) there were twenty-three patients in 1927 and twentyone patients in 1928, who have not yet paid their bills,
and whom we assume counsel do not claim are held as
prisoners in the institution? This hospital exercises
proper precautions to see to it that people pay their accounts, and that is the reason why it has been able to
keep in operation and provide necessary additional facilities. Should it be penalized by a tax because it is carefully managed, when it charges less than other good hos·
pitals and puts all net income back into the institution?
From appellant's brief we discover that by oft reiteration counsel base their contention that respondent's
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property is subject to ta-x upon th~ clain1 that rt\~pondE'nt
: is not a charitable institution. Tht.'Y a~sert this to lw
~ the question for detennination for they ~ay:
··The~e n1atter~ thu~ put in is~Ut' nll g-o to
the one big and controlling ques.til)ll beflH"t.' tht·
court in thi~ case: Is the plninti ff a charitable
institution and i~ its property used t'Xdusi\.t'lY for
charitable purpo~e~:· ( . -\pp.
.
Br. p. 1~.)
Then they declare :
··From the admi~~ion~ made and conceded by
the plaintiff in it~ pleadings, it a ffirma ti veh· a ppears that the plaintiff i~ not a charitable institution, .. etc. ( . -\.pp.
.
Br. p. 15.)
:: This statement is repeated on page 16; again on page

36; once more on page 37 and again on page -1-t
We have shown that the character·of the organization
~- is not material in determining whether its property is
~ subject to taxation.
The Gitzhoffen case, 32 l" tah 46 •
.. - 88 Pac. 691, cited by counsel, ~ no application here.
~ While it did determine that the Sisters of Holy Cros:;
~~:.Hospital Association, organized with a capital stock, etc.,
~ was one organized for pecuniary profit and gain, so as
·; to render it liable for negligence of its employes, and
~ that the articles were the only competent evidence of
j]]ll its character, the question of the taxation of its propert:v
~. was not involved.
It was not a question as to the
~ :: character of the use of its property but simply a ques> tion of the classification into which the institution
:. should be placed from a reading of its articles so as
~· to determine the rule of liability for negligence.
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Counsel attempts to bring respondent within the
rule of the Parker-Quinn and Odd F'ellows cases by suggesting that as, in those eases, property from which rental was derived was held to be taxable, hospital property
should be taxed because the fees charged are comparable
to rental (App. Br. p. 36). There is no merit in such
argument for the reason that the hospital charges are
not rental. They are for rooms, food, nursing, supplies
and for all hospital service, and these rates are not
charged to derive income from the property apart from
the charitable use of the property itself, as was the case
in Parker vs. Quinn and Odd Fellows vs. Naylor. The.~
charges are income from the operation of the hospital
but they are not rental for the use of the property.
We again remind the court that in applying the con-1
stitutional and statutory provisions, the rule of strict
construction does not obtain as intimated by counsel
(App. Br. p. 25). The statement in the Judge-Spencer
case, 15 Utah 242, is not applicable to the constitutional
and statutory provision here involved. As stated in the
case of Elk's Lodge vs. Grover, 40 Utah 1, 120 Pac. 192,
these provisions are to be liberally construed. A reasonable analysis of the evidence makes it quite apparent that
respondent's property during 1928 was used exclusively~
for charitable purposes and that the judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, ALEXAN·DER & BUDGE,

Attorneys' for

Resp~ondent.
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